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Abstract—We consider a wireless channel shared by multiple
transmitter-receiver pairs. Their transmissions interfere with
each other. Each transmitter-receiver pair aims to maximize its
long-term average transmission rate subject to an average power
constraint. This scenario is modeled as a stochastic game under
different assumptions. We first assume that each transmitter and
receiver has knowledge of all direct and cross link channel gains.
We later relax the assumption to the knowledge of incident
channel gains and then further relax to the knowledge of the
direct link channel gains only. In all the cases, we formulate
the problem of finding the Nash equilibrium as a variational
inequality (VI) problem and present an algorithm to solve the
VI.
Keywords—Interference channel, stochastic game, Nash equilib-
rium, distributed algorithms, variational inequality.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider a wireless channel which is being shared
by multiple users to transmit their data to their respective
receivers. The transmissions of different users may cause
interference to other receivers. This is a typical scenario
in many wireless networks. In particular, this can represent
inter-cell interference on a particular wireless channel in a
cellular network. The different users want to maximize their
transmission rates. This system can be modeled in the game
theoretic framework and has been widely studied [1] - [6].
In [1], the authors have considered parallel Gaussian
interference channels. This setup is modeled as a strategic
form game and existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium
(NE) is studied. The authors provide conditions under which
the water-filling function is a contraction and thus obtain
conditions for uniqueness of NE and for convergence of
iterative water-filling. They extend these results to a multi-
antenna system in [5] and consider an asynchronous version
of iterative water-filling in [6].
An online algorithm to reach a NE for the parallel
Gaussian channels is presented in [2] when the channel gain
distributions are not known to the players. Its convergence is
also proved. In [4] authors describe some conditions under
which parallel Gaussian interference channels have multiple
Nash equilibria. Using variational inequalities, they present
an algorithm that converges to a Nash equilibrium which
minimizes the overall weighted interference.
We consider power allocation in a non-game-theoretic
framework in [7] (see also other references in [7] for such
a setup). In [7], we have proposed a centralized algorithm for
finding the Pareto points that maximize sum rate when the
receivers have knowledge of all the channel gains and decode
the messages from strong and very strong interferers instead
of treating them as noise.
All the above cited works consider a one shot non-
cooperative game (or a Pareto point). As against that we con-
sider a stochastic game over Gaussian interference channels,
where the users want to maximize their long term average rate
and have long term average power constraints (for potential
advantages of this over one shot optimization, see [8], [9]). For
this system we obtain existence of NE and develop algorithms
to obtain NE via variational inequalities. Further more, the
above mentioned literature considers the problem when each
user knows all the channel gains in the system while we also
consider the much more realistic situation when a user knows
only its own channel gains.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present
the system model and formulate it as a stochastic game. In
Section III, we study this stochastic game and define the basic
terminology. In Section IV, we propose an algorithm to solve
the formulated variational inequality under general conditions.
In Section V we use this algorithm to obtain NE when the
users have only partial information about the channel gains.
In Section VI, we present numerical examples and Section
VII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND NOTATION
We consider a Gaussian wireless channel being shared
by N transmitter-receiver pairs. The time axis is slotted and
all users’ slots are synchronized. The channel gains of each
transmit-receive pair are constant during a slot and change
independently from slot to slot. These assumptions are usually
made for this system [1], [9].
Let Hij(k) be the random variable that represents channel
gain from transmitter j to receiver i (for transmitter i, receiver
i is the intended receiver) in slot k. The direct channel power
gains |Hii(k)|2 ∈ Hd = {g(d)1 , g
(d)
2 , . . . , g
(d)
n1 } and the cross
channel power gains |Hij(k)|2 ∈ Hc = {g(c)1 , g
(c)
2 , . . . , g
(c)
n2 }.
Let πd and πc be the probability distributions on Hd and Hc
respectively. We assume that, {Hij(k), k ≥ 0} is an i.i.d
sequence with distribution πij where πij = πd if i = j and
πij = πc if i 6= j. We also assume that these sequences are
independent of each other.
We denote (Hij(k), i, j = 1, . . . , N) by H(k) and its
realization vector by h(k) which takes values in H, the set of
all possible channel states. The distribution of H(k) is denoted
by π. We call the channel gains (Hij(k), j = 1, . . . , N) from
all the transmitters to the receiver i an incident gain of user i
and denote by Hi(k) and its realization vector by hi(k) which
takes values in I, the set of all possible incident channel gains.
The distribution of Hi(k) is denoted by πI .
Each user aims to operate at a power allocation that
maximizes its long term average rate under an average power
constraint. Since their transmissions interfere with each other,
affecting their transmission rates, we model this scenario as a
stochastic game.
We first assume complete channel knowledge at all trans-
mitters and receivers. If user i uses power Pi(H(k)) in slot k,
it gets rate log (1 + Γi (P (H(k)))), where
Γi(P (H(k))) =
αi|Hii(k)|
2Pi(H(k))
1 +
∑
j 6=i |Hij(k)|
2Pj(H(k))
, (1)
P (H(k)) = (P1(H(k)), . . . , PN (H(k))) and αi is a constant
that depends on the modulation and coding used by transmitter
i and we assume αi = 1 for all i. The aim of each user i is to
choose a power policy to maximize its long term average rate
ri(Pi,P−i) , lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
E[log (1 + Γi (P (H(k))))],
(2)
subject to average power constraint
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
E[Pi(H(k))] ≤ P i, for each i, (3)
where P−i denotes the power policies of all users except i.
We denote this game by GA.
We next assume that the ith transmitter-receiver pair has
knowledge of its incident gains Hi only. Then the rate of user
i is
ri(Pi,P−i) ,
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
EHi(k)
[
EH−i(k)[log (1 + Γi(Hi(k),H−i(k)))]
]
,
(4)
where Pi(H(k)) depends only on Hi(k) and EX denotes
expectation with respect to the distribution of X . Each user
maximizes its rate subject to (3), we denote this game by GI .
We also consider a game assuming that each transmitter-
receiver pair knows only its direct link gain Hii. This is the
most realistic assumption since each receiver i can estimate
Hii and feed it back to transmitter i. In this case, the rate of
user i is given by
ri(Pi,P−i) , lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
EHii(k)
[
EH−ii(k)
[log (1 + Γi(Hii(k), H−ii(k)))]] , (5)
where Pi(H(k)) is a function of Hii(k) only. Here, H−ii
denotes the channel gains of all other links in the interference
channel except Hii. In this game, each user maximizes its rate
(5) under the average power constraint (3). We denote this
game by GD.
We address these problems as stochastic games with the
set of feasible power policies of user i denoted by Ai and its
utility by ri. Let A = ΠNi=1Ai.
We limit ourselves to stationary policies, i.e., the power
policy for every user in slot k depends only on the channel
state H(k) and not on k. In the current setup, it does not
entail any loss in optimality. In fact now we can rewrite
the optimization problem in G to find policy P (H) such
that ri = EH[log (1 + Γi (P (H)))] is maximized subject to
EH [Pi(H)] ≤ P i for all i. Similarly, we can rewrite the
optimization problems in games GI and GD . We express power
policy of player i by Pi = (Pi(h), h ∈ H), where transmitter
i transmits in channel state h with power Pi(h). We denote
the power profile of all players by P = (P1, . . . ,PN ).
In the rest of the paper, we prove existence of a Nash
equilibrium for each of these games and provide algorithm to
compute it.
III. GAME THEORETIC REFORMULATION
Theory of variational inequalities offers various algorithms
to find NE of a given game [13]. A variational inequality
problem denoted by V I(K,F ) is defined as follows.
Definition 1. Let K ⊂ Rn be a closed and convex set, and
F : K → K . The variational inequality problem V I(K,F ) is
defined as the problem of finding x ∈ K such that
F (x)T (y − x) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ K.
We reformulate the Nash equilibrium problem at hand
to an affine variational inequality problem. We denote our
game by G =
(
(Ai)
N
i=1, (ri)
N
i=1
)
, where ri(Pi,P−i) =
EH[log (1 + Γi (P (H)))] and Ai = {Pi ∈ RN :
EH [Pi(H)] ≤ P i, Pi(h) ≥ 0 for all h ∈ H}.
Definition 2. A point P∗ is a Nash Equilibrium (NE) of game
G =
(
(Ai)
N
i=1, (ri)
N
i=1
)
if for each player i
ri(P
∗
i ,P
∗
−i) ≥ ri(Pi,P
∗
−i) for all Pi ∈ Ai.
Existence of a pure NE for the strategic games GA,GI and
GD follows from the Debreu-Glicksberg-Fan Theorem ([10],
page no. 69), since in our game ri(Pi,P−i) is a continuous
function in the profile of strategies P = (Pi,P−i) ∈ A and
concave in Pi for GA,GI and GD .
Definition 3. The best-response of player i is a function BRi :
A−i → Ai such that BRi(P−i) maximizes ri(Pi,P−i),
subject to Pi ∈ Ai.
We see that the Nash equilibrium is a fixed point of the
best-response function. In the following we provide algorithms
to obtain this fixed point for GA. In Section V we will consider
GI and GD . Given other players’ power profile P−i, we use
Lagrange method to evaluate the best response of player i. The
Lagrangian function is defined by
Li(Pi,P−i) = ri(Pi,P−i) + λi(P i − EH [Pi(H)]).
To maximize Li(Pi,P−i), we solve for Pi such that ∂Li∂Pi(h) =
0 for each h ∈ H. Thus, the component of the best response of
player i, BRi(P−i) corresponding to channel state h is given
by
BRi(P−i;h) =
max
{
0, λi(P−i)−
(1 +
∑
j 6=i |hij |
2Pj(h))
|hii|2
}
, (6)
where λi(P−i) is chosen such that the average power con-
straint is satisfied.
It is easy to observe that the best-response of player i to
a given strategy of other players is water-filling on fi(P−i) =
(fi(P−i;h), h ∈ H) where
fi(P−i;h) =
(1 +
∑
j 6=i |hij |
2Pj(h))
|hii|2
. (7)
For this reason, we represent the best-response of player i by
WFi(P−i). The notation used for the overall best-response
WF(P) = (WF(P (h)), h ∈ H), where WF(P (h)) =
(WF1(P−1;h), . . . ,WFN (P−N ;h)) and WFi(P−i;h) is as
defined in (6). We use WFi(P−i) = (WFi(P−i;h), h ∈ H).
It is observed in [1] that the best-response WFi(P−i) is
also the solution of the optimization problem
minimize ‖Pi + fi(P−i)‖2 , subject to Pi ∈ Ai. (8)
As a result we can interpret the best-response as the projection
of (−fi,1(P−i), . . . ,−fi,N (P−i)) on to Ai. We denote the
projection of x on to Ai by ΠAi(x). We consider (8), as
a game in which every player minimizes its cost function
‖Pi + fi(P−i)‖
2
with strategy set of player i being Ai. We
denote this game by G′. This game has the same set of NEs
as G because the best responses of these two games are
equal. We now formulate the variational inequality problem
corresponding to the game G′.
Observe that (8) is a convex optimization problem. Given
P−i, a necessary and sufficient condition for P∗i to be a
solution of the convex optimization problem of player i ([11],
page 210) is given by∑
h∈H
(P ∗i (h) + fi(P−i;h)) (xi(h)− P
∗
i (h)) ≥ 0, (9)
for all xi ∈ Ai. Thus, P∗ is a NE of the game G′ if (9) holds
for each player i. We can rewrite the N inequalities in (9) in
compact form as(
P∗ + hˆ+ HˆP∗
)T
(x−P∗) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ A, (10)
where hˆ is a N1-length block vector with N1 = |H|, the
cardinality of H, each block hˆ(h), h ∈ H, is of length N
and is defined by hˆ(h) =
(
1
|h11|2
, . . . , 1|hNN |2
)
and Hˆ is the
block diagonal matrix Hˆ = diag
{
Hˆ(h), h ∈ H
}
with each
block Hˆ(h) defined by
[Hˆ(h)]ij =
{
0 if i = j,
|hij |
2
|hii|2
, else.
The characterization of Nash equilibrium in (10) corre-
sponds to solving for P in the variational inequality problem
V I(A, F ),
F (P)T (x−P) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ A,
where F (P) = (I + Hˆ)P+ hˆ.
IV. SOLVING THE VI FOR GENERAL CHANNELS
In [17], we proved that if H˜ = (I + Hˆ) is positive
semidefinite, then the fixed point iteration
P(n) = ΠA(P
(n−1) − τF (P(n−1))), (11)
converges to a NE. This condition is much weaker than one
would obtain by using the methods in [1]. In the current setup
we aim to find a NE even if H˜ is not positive semidefinite.
For this, we present an algorithm to solve the V I(A, F ) in
general.
We note that a solution P∗ of V I(A, F ) satisfies
P∗ = ΠA (P
∗ − τF (P∗)) . (12)
Thus, P∗ is a fixed point of the mapping T (P) =
ΠA (P− F (P)). Using this fact, we reformulate the varia-
tional inequality problem as a non-convex optimization prob-
lem
minimize ‖P−ΠA (P− F (P)) ‖2,
subject to P ∈ A. (13)
The feasible region A of P, can be written as a Cartesian
product of Ai, for each i, as the constraints of each player
are decoupled in power variables. As a result, we can split the
projection ΠA(.) into multiple projections ΠAi(.) for each i,
i.e., ΠA(x) = (ΠA1(x1), . . . ,ΠAN (xN )). For each player i,
the projection operation ΠAi(xi) takes the form
ΠAi(xi) = (max (0, xi (h)− λi) , h ∈ H) , (14)
where λi is chosen such that the average power constraint is
satisfied. Using (14), we rewrite the objective function in (13)
as
‖P−ΠA (P− F (P)) ‖
2 =∑
h∈H,i
(Pi (h)−max {0,−fi(P−i;h)− λi})
2
=
∑
h∈H,i
(
min
{
Pi(h),
1 +
∑
j |hij |
2Pj(h)
|hii|2
+ λi
})2
=
∑
h∈H,i
(min {Pi(h), Pi(h) + fi(P−i;h) + λi})2 . (15)
At a NE, the left side of equation (15) is zero and hence each
minimum term on the right side of the equation must be zero
as well. This happens, only if
Pi(h) =

0, if
1+
∑
j 6=i |hij |
2Pj(h)
|hii|2
+ λi > 0,
−
1+
∑
j 6=i |hij |
2Pj(h)
|hii|2
− λi, otherwise.
Here, the Lagrange multiplier λi can be negative, as the
projection satisfies the average power constraint with equality.
At a NE Player i will not transmit if the ratio of total
interference plus noise to the direct link gain is more than
some threshold.
We now propose a heuristic algorithm to find an optimizer
of (13). This algorithm consists of two phases. In the first
phase, it attempts to find a better estimate of a power allocation
using the fixed point iteration on the mapping T (P) that is
close to a NE. For GA this is algorithm (11) itself, which
converges to the NE when H˜ is positive semidefinite. When
this condition does not hold, then we use it in Algorithm 1 to
get a good initial point for the steepest descent algorithm of
Phase 2. We will show in Section VI that it indeed provides
a very good initial point for Phase 2. For games GI and GD
we will provide more justification for Phase 1 by showing that
this corresponds to a better response dynamics. In the second
phase, using the estimate obtained from Phase 1 as the initial
point, the algorithm runs the steepest descent method to find a
NE. It is possible that the steepest descent algorithm may stop
at a local minimum which is not a NE. This is because of the
non-convex nature of the optimization problem. If the steepest
descent method in Phase 2 terminates at a local minimum
which is not a NE, we again invoke Phase 1 with this local
minimum as the initial point and then go over to Phase 2. We
present the complete algorithm in Algorithm 1.
In Section VI we provide an example when H˜ is positive
semidefinite and use the algorithm in [17] to obtain a NE. We
also use Algorithm 1 and obtain the same NE (which will be
obtained from the first phase itself). Next we provide examples
where H˜ is not positive semidefinite. Thus the algorithm in
[17] may not converge. The present algorithm provides the
NEs in just a few iterations of Phase 1 and Phase 2.
Algorithm 1 Heuristic algorithm to find a Nash equilibrium
Fix ǫ > 0, δ > 0 and a positive integer MAX
Phase 1 : Initialization phase
Initialize P(0)i for all i = 1, . . . , N .
for n = 1→ MAX do
P(n) = T (P(n−1))
end for
go to Phase 2.
Phase 2 : Optimization phase
Initialize t = 1,P(t) = PMAX ,
loop
For each i, P(t+1)i = Steepest Descent(P˜(t)i , i)
where P˜(t)i = (P
(t+1)
1 , . . . ,P
(t+1)
i−1 ,P
(t)
i , . . . ,P
(t)
N ),
P(t+1) = (P
(t+1)
1 , . . . ,P
(t+1)
N ),
t = t+ 1,
Till ‖P(t) − T (P(t))‖ < ǫ
if ‖P(t) −P(t+1)‖ < δ and ‖P(t) − T (P(t))‖ > ǫ then
Go to Phase 1 with P(0) = P(t)
end if
end loop
function STEEPEST DESCENT(P(t), i)
▽f(P(t)) = ( ∂f(P)
∂Pi(h)
|P=P(t) , h ∈ H)
where f(P) = ‖P− T (P)‖2
for h ∈ H do
evaluate ∂f(P)
∂Pi(h)
|P=P(t) using derivative approxima-
tion
end for
P
(t+1)
i = ΠAi(P
(t)
i − γt▽f(P
(t)))
return P(t+1)i
end function
V. PARTIAL INFORMATION GAMES
In partial information games, we can not write the problem
of finding a NE as an affine variational inequality, because the
best response is not water-filling and should be evaluated nu-
merically. In this section, we show that we can use Algorithm
1 to find a NE even for these information games.
A. Game GI
We first consider the game GI and find its NE using
Algorithm 1. We follow on similar lines as in Sections III
and IV. We write the variational inequality formulation of the
NE problem. For user i, the optimization at hand is
maximize r(I)i , subject to Pi ∈ Ai, (16)
where r(I)i =
∑
hi∈I
π(hi)E
[
log
(
1 + |hii|
2Pi(hi)
1+
∑
j 6=i |hij|
2Pj(Hj)
)]
.
The necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for the
convex optimization problem (16) are
(xi −P
∗
i )
T (−▽ir
(I)
i (P
∗
i ,P−i)) ≥ 0, for all xi ∈ Ai, (17)
where ▽ir(I)i (P∗i ,P−i) is the gradient of r
(I)
i with respect to
power variables of user i. Then P∗ is a NE if and only if
(17) is satisfied for all i = 1, . . . , N . We can write the N
inequalities in (17) as
(x−P∗)TF (P∗) ≥ 0, for all x ∈ A, (18)
where F (P) = (−▽1r(I)1 (P), . . . ,−▽Nr
(I)
N (P))
T
. Equation
(18) is the required variational inequality characterization. A
solution of the variational inequality is a fixed point of the
mapping TI(P) = ΠA(P − τF (P)), for τ > 0. We use
Algorithm 1, to find a fixed point of TI(P) by replacing T (P)
in Algorithm 1 with TI(P).
B. Better response
In this subsection, we interpret TI(P) as a better response
for each user. For this, consider the optimization problem (16).
For this, using the gradient projection method, the update rule
for power variables of user i is
P
(n+1)
i = ΠAi(P
(n)
i + τ▽ir
(I)
i (P
(n))). (19)
The gradient projection method ensures that for a given P(n)−i ,
r
(I)
i (P
(n+1)
i ,P
(n)
−i ) ≥ r
(I)
i (P
(n)
i ,P
(n)
−i ). Therefore, we can
interpret P(n+1)i as a better response to P
(n)
−i than P
(n)
i . As
the feasible space A = ΠNi=1Ai, we can combine the update
rules of all players and write
P(n+1) = ΠA(P
(n) − τF (P(n))) = TI(P
(n)). (20)
Thus, the Phase 1 of Algorithm 1 is the iterated better response
algorithm.
Consider a fixed point P∗ of the better response TI(P).
Then it implies that, given P∗−i, P∗i is a local optimum of(16) for all i. Since the optimization (16) is convex, P∗i is
also a global optimum. Thus given P∗−i, P∗i is best response
for all i and hence NE is also a fixed point of the better
response function. This gives further justification for Phase
1 of Algorithm 1. We could not provide this justification for
GA when H˜ is not positive semidefinite. Indeed we will show
in the next section that in such a case Phase 1 often provides
a NE for GI and GD (for which also Phase 1 provides a better
response dynamics; see Section V-D below) but not for GA.
C. Lower bound
In the computation of NE, each user i is required to know
the power profile P−i of all other users. We now give a lower
bound on the utility r(I)i of player i that does not depend on
other players’ power profiles.
We can easily prove that the function inside the expectation
in r(I)i is a convex function of Pj(hj) for fixed Pi(hi) using
the fact that ([16]) a function f : K ⊆ Rn → R is convex if
and only if
d2f(x+ ty)
dt2
≥ 0,
for all x,y ∈ K and t ∈ R is such that x+ ty ∈ K. Then by
Jensen’s inequality to the inner expectation in r(I)i ,
r
(I)
i =
∑
hi∈I
π(hi)E
[
log
(
1 +
|hii|
2Pi(hi)
1 +
∑
j 6=i |hij |
2Pj(Hj)
)]
≥
∑
hi∈I
π(hi)log
(
1 +
|hii|
2Pi(hi)
1 +
∑
j 6=i |hij |
2E[Pj(Hj)]
)
=
∑
hi∈I
π(hi)log
(
1 +
|hii|
2Pi(hi)
1 +
∑
j 6=i |hij |
2Pj
)
. (21)
The above lower bound r(I)i,LB(Pi) of r
(I)
i (Pi,P−i) does not
depend on the power profile of players other than i. We can
choose a power allocation Pi of player i that maximizes
r
(I)
i,LB(Pi). It is the water-filling solution given by
Pi(hi) = max
{
0, λi −
1 +
∑
j 6=i |hij |
2Pj
|hii|2
}
.
Let P∗ = (P∗i ,P∗−i) be a NE, and let P
†
i be the maxi-
mizer for the lower bound r(I)i,LB(Pi). Then, r
(I)
i (P
∗
i ,P
∗
−i) ≥
r
(I)
i (Pi,P
∗
−i) for all Pi ∈ Ai, in particular for Pi = P
†
i .
Thus, r(I)i (P∗i ,P∗−i) ≥ r
(I)
i (P
†
i ,P
∗
−i). But, r
(I)
i (P
†
i ,P
∗
−i) ≥
r
(I)
i,LB(P
†
i ). Therefore, r
(I)
i (P
∗
i ,P
∗
−i) ≥ r
(I)
i,LB(P
†
i ). But, in
general it may not hold that r(I)i (P∗i ,P∗−i) ≥ r
(I)
i (P
†
i ,P
†
−i).
D. Game GD
We now consider the game GD where each user i has
knowledge of only the corresponding direct link gain Hii.
In this case also we can formulate the variational inequality
characterization. The variational inequality becomes
(x−P∗)TFD(P
∗) ≥ 0, for all x ∈ A, (22)
where FD(P) = (−▽1r(D)1 (P), . . . ,−▽Nr
(D)
N (P))
T
. We use
Algorithm 1 to solve the variational inequality (22) by finding
fixed points of TD(P) = ΠA(P − τFD(P)). Also, one can
show that as for TI , TD provides a better response strategy.
We can also derive a lower bound on r(D)i using convexity
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Fig. 1. Sum rate comparison at Nash equilibrium points for Example 1.
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Fig. 2. Sum rate comparison at Nash equilibrium points for Example 2.
and Jensen’s inequality as in (21). The optimal solution for
the lower bound is the water-filling solution
Pi(hii) = max
{
0, λi −
1 +
∑
j 6=i E[|Hij |
2]Pj
|hii|2
}
.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section we compare the sum rate achieved at a Nash
equilibrium under the different assumptions on the channel
gain knowledge, obtained using the algorithms provided above.
In all the numerical examples, we have chosen τ = 0.1 and
the step size in the steepest descent method γt = 0.5 for t = 1
and is updated after 10 iterations as γt+10 = γt1+γt . We choose
a 3-user interference channel for Examples 1 and 2 below.
For Example 1, we take Hd = {0.3, 1} and Hc =
{0.2, 0.1}. We assume that all elements of Hd,Hc occur with
equal probability, i.e., with probability 0.5. Now, the H˜ matrix
is positive definite and there exists a unique NE. Thus, the
fixed point iteration (11) converge to the unique NE for GA.
Algorithm 1 also converges to this NE not only for GA but
also for GI and GD.
We compare the sum rates for the NE under different
assumptions in Figure 1. We have also computed Q = P†
that maximizes the corresponding lower bounds (21), evaluated
the sum rate s(Q) and compared to the sum rate at a NE. The
sum rates at Nash equilibria for GI and GD are close. This is
because the values of the cross link channel gains are close and
hence knowing the cross link channel gains has less impact.
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Fig. 3. Sum rate comparison at Nash equilibrium points for Example 3.
We now give a couple of examples in which H˜ is not
positive semidefinite and hence fixed point iteration (11) fails
to converge to a NE but Algorithm 1 converges to a NE for
GA, GI and GD .
For Example 2, we take Hd = {0.3, 1} and Hc =
{0.1, 0.5}. We assume that all elements of Hd,Hc occur with
equal probability. We compare the sum rates for the NE in
Figures 2. Now we see significant differences in the sum rates.
Consider a 2-user interference channel for Example 3.
We take Hd = {0.1, 0.5, 1} and Hc = {0.25, 0.5, 0.75}.
We assume that all elements of Hd,Hc occur with equal
probability. In this example also, we use Algorithm 1 to find
NE for the different cases and the lower bound. We compare
the sum rates for the NE in Figures 3. We further elaborate
on the usefulness of Phase 1 in Algorithm 1. We quantify the
closeness of P to a NE by g(P) = ‖P−T (P)‖. If P is a NE,
g(P) = 0 and for two different power allocations P and Q,
we say that P is closer to a NE than Q if g(P) < g(Q). We
now verify that the fixed point iterations in the initialization
phase of Algorithm 1 takes us closer to a NE starting from
any randomly chosen feasible power allocation. For this, we
have randomly generated 100 feasible power allocations and
run Phase 1 for MAX = 100 for each randomly chosen power
allocation and compared the values of g(P). In the following,
we compare the mean and standard deviation of the values of
g(P) immediately after random generation of feasible power
allocations to those after running the initialization phase for
the 100 initial points chosen.
For complete information game, in Example 1: (mean,
standard deviation) of values of g(P) after random generation
of feasible power allocations at 10dB and 15dB is (230.86, 3.8)
and (659.22, 9.21) respectively. The (mean, standard deviation)
for those samples after running the Phase 1 are (0.6260, 0.055)
and (2.05, 0.166) respectively at 10dB and 15dB. Similarly in
Example 2: (mean, standard deviation) of g(P) after random
generation is (309.12, 4.4) and (950.01, 10.41) respectively at
10dB and 15dB and those after initialization phase are (9.63,
1.83) and (32.26, 6.6). In Example 3: the mean and standard
deviation of g(P) immediately after the random generation
are (101.85, 1.1140) at 10dB and (339.97, 9.68) at 15dB.
The (mean, standard deviation) after running the Phase 1 are
(0.83, 0.68) at 10dB and (2.82, 1.47) at 15dB. Thus, we can
see that the phase 1 in Algorithm 1 provide a much better
approximation to a NE than a randomly chosen feasible power
allocation.
For all the three examples, for GI and GD , Phase 1 itself
provides the NE.
We have run Algorithm 1 on many more examples and
found that it computed the NE, and for GI and GD the Phase
1 itself provided the NE.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have considered a channel shared by multiple
transmitter-receiver pairs causing interference to each other.
We have modeled this system as a non-cooperative stochastic
game. Different transmitter-receiver pairs may or may not have
channel gain information about other pairs’ channel gains. Ex-
ploiting variational inequalities, we provide an algorithm that
obtains NE in the various examples studied quite efficiently.
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